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years. Indeed, to modern science
we owe the example par excellence

DR. LAFOREY WINS INTERNATIONAL PRIZE
FOR MEDICAL ETHICS
AWARDED POPE ]OHN

XXI

MEDAL

Dr. Eugene G. Laforet of Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts was honored by th,
national Congress of Catholic Doctors for his paper "The 'Hopeless' Case"
its tenth triennial meeting held in London during early July. As the report
Congress appearing elsewhere in this issue indicates, the Pope fohn XXI Inter
Prize for Medical Ethics was instituted by the Association of Portuguese
in 1952 and it is awarded every third year.
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Dr. Laforet edits our Abstracts section each quarter and has contributed a amber
of excellent articles to LINACR.E QUARTERLY. We value his assistanc• o our
Editorial Board and congratulate him most sincerely on receiving this Inte, ,tiona/
Award. We are very happy to include the prize-winning paper in this Aug, issue.
It is published with the kind permission of the International Federation of ,tholic
Medical Associations from the Acts. (Proceedings of the Congress.)

THE "HOPELESS" CASE

0 God, Who has doomed all men to die, but has concealed from
all the hour of our death, grant that we may pass our days in
the practice of holiness and justice ....
- Prayer for a Happy Death
INTRODUCTION

When, in a given patient, there
has been established a firm diag
nosis of a relatively chronic condi
tion that may be expected to ter
minate fatally because curative
treatment is either not known or
not applicable, the case may prop
perly be considered "hopeless."
Under these circumstances medico
moral problems are almost inevi
table; they are accentuated when
the pathogenesis is obscure, when
remission is .rare, and when the
general health of the patient is
apparently good. 'Almost b y com
mon acceptance the prototype
"hopeless case" is the patient with
incurable malignancy. Unfortun
ately there are many other diseas-
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es, such as central nervous ,ystem
neuropathies, that may re, iily be
included in this baleful c.-:egory.
It is evident, but neverth•. less of
considerable significance, t :1at the
term "hopeless" in this cc:-1text is
relative - its limits are defined by
the current state of medical knowl
edge. Scientific progress has nar•
rowed these boundaries in some
areas and expanded them in others.
Pernicious anemia, for example.
was stricken from the list by Min ot
and Murphy, and diabetes mallitus
by Banting and Best. On the other
hand, Wegener's granulomatosis
and idiopathic pulmonary hemo•
siderosis are but two of the poten·
tially "hopeless" diseases that hav e
been added to nosology in recent
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of the "hopeless case" - the in
dividual who has accidentally re
ceived a lethal dose of ionizing ra
diation, whose early doom is sealed
beyond doubt, but who, for the
m o ment, r e m a i n s c o m p l e t e l y
asymptomatic.
And yet even the stark term
"hopeless" can perhaps be mitigat
ed to some extent ... while many
diseases may be "hopeless" in
terms of ultimate survival, they
may be far from so in terms of
effective palliation and worthwhile
existence.

What specific medico-moral dif
ficulties may be engendered by the
"hopeless'·· patient? Primarily, of
course, there may be problems as
sociated with therapy - for ex
ample, whether to employ vigorous
trea.tment or, indeed, whether to
treat at all. A second important
facet concerns the imparting of
pertinent medical information to the patient, to relatives, and to
other interested parties. Further,
the "hopeless" aspect almost neces
sa rily invites a consideration of
hu man experimentation, either re
lated or unrelated to the disease at
hand and aimed either at immedi
ate benefit to the subject or at re
mote benefit to others. Finally,
a ssociated intimately with these
topics hut worthy of separate con
sider ation, certain spiritual aspects
of the "hopeless" patient merit
comment. In the following pages
the se medico-moral features will be
discussed individually and an at
leinpt will be made to draw con
clu sions that are consonant with
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Christian ethics and accepted med
ical practice.
THERAPY

Every physician, whether or not
"psychosomatically oriented," ap
preciates that the dichotomy be
tween the psyche and the soma,
between the spiritual and the phys
ical, is artificial and arbitrary. It
is, however, a convenient distinc
tion.and one that permits a certain
analytic approach not otherwise
possible. In spite of the foregoing,
the physician has traditionally been
concerned more with the outward
aspects of disease than with its
subtler feat�res, and the following
discussion of "therapy" specifically
excludes such modalities as are
primarily spiritual. psychiatric, or
sociologic.
What norms, then, does one em
ploy in the physical treatment of
the "hopeless case"? The spectrum
varies widely; it ranges from the
deliberate and direct extinction of
life to vigorous efforts at maintain
ing a semblance of vitality in a
mo ribund patient. Certainly be
tween these extremes, but not al
ways susceptible of precise defini
tion. lies the Christian attitude.

Euthanasia: The directly intend
ed and procured death of a patient
in order to terminate suffering has
been designated "euthanasia." It
is probably coeval with the history
of mankind. Regardless of motive,
it constitutes an intrinsically evil
act and as such is not licit. "Thou
shalt not kill" permits of no other
interpretation.
May not a physician, however,
act with propriety and as a mere
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agent in ending the life of a patient
who desires and consents to eu
thanasia? Because man exercises
only custodial privileges in this
matter, such consent cannot validly
be granted.
Fundamental to any considera
tion of euthanasia is the fact that
pain and suffering, while physical
evils, are morally indeterminate,
neither good nor evil per se. Con
sequently any argument based
upon the premise that pain and
suffering are intrinsically evil is
fallacious.
Prescinding from moral consid
erations, Kamisar 1 has presented
virtually unassailable arguments
against euthanasia. In brief, he
holds that the risk of error and
abuse is so large that permissive
legislation regarding euthanasia
would be impracticable.

Unconscionable Prolongation of
Vital Functions: Technologic ad

vances have made it possible to
maintain for a considerable interval
a semblance of vitality in a mori
bund. or actually dead, patient.
Respiratory movements can be in
duced extrinsically, as with a res
pirator, and cardiac function simi
larly, as with electrical stimulation
or mechanical support. Under
these conditions, however, one is
dealing not with a living human
being but with a functioning
human heart-lung preparation.
Such measures hardly seem war
ranted in the case of a chronically
ill patient in whom cessation of
respiratory or cardiac activity is
but the final outward manifestation
of death. Undue prolongation of
vital functions, therefore, may or
128

may not be licit, depending 1pon
the intent of the physician.
ddi
tional elements to be conside1 .i in
elude charity to the patier. and
justice to the relatives. H a use
even unreasonable prolonga. m of
vital functions, unlike euth asia.
is not intrinsically evil. it is c vious
that a firm and unqualified ;tale
ment regarding its moralit; s not
possible.

The Middle Ground: Ordi
nary" versus "Extraor nary"
Means:
Thou shalt not kill but ed
not strive
Officiously to keep a/1
In the present context ti temp
tation to quote this Shavia ouplet
is · well-nigh insuperable, articu
larly since it seems to ate so
succinctJy the crux of the •oblem.
Like so many other feli< Jus ex•
pressions, however, it ri s over
simplification. What, for xample,
is "officious" striving? Ir ,he suc
ceeding paragraphs this . d relat·
ed topics will be discus� !.
As a guide to the s ution of
difficulties involved in t'. present
subject the Church ma�,s a dis·
tinction between "ordi1, ry" and
Thus.
"extraordinary" mean.
there is a moral obligation to take
all "ordinary" means to preserve
life and health, but res, rt to "ex
2
traordinary" means is optional.
It is obvious that a u111versal def
inition of these terms is impossible.
since such circumstances as tim e.
place, and person may constit ute
the final determinants. Once the
,
principle has been enunciated
ers
def
therefore, the Church wisely
to the judgment of the intereste d
LY
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parties. It is at this level of "prac
tical ethics" that the major difficul
ties arise.
While not necessarily confined
to the "hopeless case," the problem
of ultra-radical surgery requires
consideration here because of the
implicit suggestion that without
such means a potentially curable
patient may become "hopeless," or
a "hopeless" patient may be denied
palliation. A classic contribution
in this matter has been made by
Ford and Drew,3 who list the fol
lowing factors that must be
weighed by the physician-coun
selor:

I. The patient's spiritual well
.being: While not a prime re
sponsibility of the physician,
this element must be considered
when advising radical surgery.
"Is the patient prepared to
.die?" and "Would he be prepared, or better prepared, if his
life were prolonged?" are quer
ies of importance.
2. The patient's own desire to
continue his life by extraordi
nary means: The balanced
judgment of the patient must
be considered.
3. The expected length of survi
val and the degree of comfort
expected: These should be
commensurate with the drastic
procedure contemplated .
i. The effect of the patient's sur
vival on his associates: This
includes such elements as stress
and strain on the members of
the family and the cost of con
tinuous medical care.
5 , The advancement of science:
This is considered an important
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reason for advising radical sur
gery only when the patient
wishes to contribute to science
in this manner, or when it does
not conflict in any way with his
personal interest.
In medically evaluating the jus
tification of radical cancer surgery
Whipple� has cited the following
factors as important: 1. threat of
the disease, 2. operative risk, 3. the
probability of cure and long term
survival. 1. the assurance of relief
of symptoms, even though pallia
tive or temporary, and 5. the abil
ity of the patient to adapt to the
dysfunction or deformity that may
result. In a similar vein, Stone5, 6
has contended that the feasibility
of technical success in ultra-radical
surgery does not per se justify
these operations and that such
factors as patient comfort and ex
pense must be considered. In short,
then, extraordinary surgical means
may be employed in a given patient
but only when all of several factors
have been conscientiously evalu
ated.
What norms govern the use of
extraordinary non-surgical means
in the " hopeless" patient? Accord
ing to Collins, 7 "No physician is
obligated to institute extraordinary
measures to save life, especially un
der impossible circumstances." In
support of this view, he refers to
the reply of Pope Pius XIIS to a
question asked by delegates to the
International Congress of Anes
thetists in 1957. The query con
cerned the right, or obligation, of
the anesthetist to use modern tech
nics of artificial respiration in all
cases of deep unconsciousness,
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"even in those that are considered
completely hopeless." To this the
Pope replied, "Since these forms
of treatment go beyond the ordi
nary means to which one is bound,
it cannot be held that there is an
obligation to use them."
It is the management of the
"hopeless" patient who actually is
dying of the underlying disease
that has stimulated so much recent
discussion. In this situation, inten
sive efforts to maintain life have
been stigmatized, perhaps rightly,
as a "prolongation of dying" rather
than of living. There is no dispute
that a prime aim is to assure the
comfort of the patient, even if such
therapy results in a shortening of
life-expectancy. Certainly the use
of expensive and painful means of
adding a few hours of life to a dy
ing patient is not in keeping with
Christian charity. There has been
considerable discussion about the
"quantity" versus "quality" of life,
about "fruitless longevity. "9, 10 , 11
Obviously it is not wise to increase
quantity of life at the expense o f
quality, or t o strive for fruitless
longevity. But however nicely such
phrases may describe the problem,
they do not contribute significantly
to its solution. Who, for example,
is to determine how much "quality"
exists in a given life, or when lon
gevity is "fruitless"? While mere
preservation of life should not b e
considered a n end in itself, there i s
reason t o believe that recent writ
ers accord too liberal an interpre
tation to "extraordinary means."
In the "hopeless" patient who i s
dying but not moribund, vigorous
and considerate therapy aimed at
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increasing both the "quantit) and
the "quality" of life certain · re
quires no defence. If a d, ision
need be made, it would seem viser
for the physician to err on tl side
of active treatment rather than
laissez faire. Cogent reaso ; for
this opinion may be addu· d as
follows:
I. The physician is fallib and
the case may not be mr ;cally
"hopeless."
2. The physician by tradit n has
con
been committed to acti
tention with disease.
3. The physician is not co• .Jetent
to determine fully the ''t ·ality"
of a given life or whet'. r lon
gevity is "fruitless."
4. Even if without posit e act,
the physician who a, ogates
to hi. mself the prerog , ive of
determining whether I e shall
·continue or terminate •.)y de
fault is in an uncon ortable
moral position.
5. The imminent discovery of new
curative agents is a , ever
present possibility.*
6. Spontaneous regression of ma·
lignancies in apparently "hope
less" patients has been docu
mented.12
7. Miraculous intervention is
possible.
8. The physician may find that
self-recrimination at errors of
omission is harsher than at
errors of commission.
9. Even a brief moment of menta l
lucidity in a moribund patient
• As an outstanding example, the advent
of methotrexate has radically altered the
outlook in metastatic choriocarcinoma,
previous]y uniformly fatal.
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may be all-important for his
spiritual welfare.
10. "Extraordinary" means of
treatment may result in cure.
Management of Pain and Other
Distressing Sy mptoms in the
"Hopeless Case"; Use of Drugs:
Because long-continued pain is
such a basic element in much of
the preceding discussion, particu
larly with respect to euthanasia. it
may be well here to consider this
aspect of the "hopeless case." Ac
cording to Perese,13 patients with
malignant disease ordinarily do not
have severe pain corresponding in
intensity to that of renal colic,
thermal burn of the skin, or facial
neuralgia. The pain of malignant
disease, however, differs from that
of benign. ·conditions in one impor
tant feature, its duration. The
mild, dull, aching, persistent pain
of the cancer patient erodes physi
cal and mental reserves alike. By
individualizing the approach it was
found possible to effect substantial
and long-term relief of pain in the
majority of patients without resort
to marked obtundation by nar
cotics. Medical, surgical, or radia
tion therapy was employed, alone
or in combination.
Similar conclusions have been
reported by Exton-Smith, H who
found that only a quarter of 33
patients terminally ill with cancer
bad moderate or severe pain and
that this could be controlled by
judicious use of narcotics. Further,
of the 220 terminally ill patients
comprising the entire study, other
distressing symptoms such as nau
sea, vomiting, dyspnea, and dys
phagia occurred in only I 7
(7.7 %).
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What of the small minority of
"hopeless" patients who do have
persistent, severe, and distressing
symptoms? This problem is par
ticularized in a recent monograph15
as follows: "In the face of severe
Ii fe threatening hemorrhage from
the bronchi in the incurable pa
tient, heavy sedation and the lib
eral use of narcotics is not only
justified but mandatory to allay the
patient's apprehension even though
their use may hasten death." This
attitude is fully consonant with
Christian ethics and susceptible of
formal defence by the principle of
the double effect. It might also be
argued that failure to use narcotics
in this situation would constitute
an extraordinary means of pre
serving life.
In summary, euthanasia is intrin
sically evil and is not licit. Un
reasonable attempts to maintain a
semblance of vitality in a moribund
or actually dead patient may offend
the virtues of charity or justice.
There is a moral obligation to take
all "ordinary" means to preserve
life and health, but resort to "ex
traordinary" means is optional.
There is no universal definition of
what constitutes "ordinary" or
"extraordinary" means since cir
cumstances constitute the final de
terminants. In general, it is wiser
for the physician to err on the side
of active therapy. Pain in the pa
tient with "hopeless" malignancy
is usually not severe and responds
readily to thoughtful treatment.
IMPARTING INFORMATION

A major problem in managing
the "hopeless case" concerns the
imparting of pertinent diagnostic
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and prognostic information to the of the entire problem by mai1 ain 
patient and to other interested per ing that the patient cannot b told
sons. Because this facet of the "the truth" because this � nply
"hopeless case" is so intimately re cannot be determined. To , so,
lated to psychologic and sociologic however, would be to igno the
management, these aspects are also numerous complexities assr ated
considered in this section. While with this subject.
equally applicable to all "hopeless"
It must not be concluded, 1ere
diseases, the discussion will be fore, that "the truth" in this { ntext
concerned primarily with malig has no meaning, but rather ,at it
nancy. since it is this disease that requires definition. What, , !n, is
evokes the greatest emotional re "the truth"? Essentially it
best
sponse.
clinical judgment of the pr ;ician
"Resolved: That the Patient concerning the expected cc se of
Should Always Be Told 'the events in a given patient ith a
1tistic
Truth'": Considerable debate, given diagnosis. It is a
some of it producing more heat applied to a person and as 1ch is
than light, has centered about this intrinsically inaccurate. P. . uarial
subject. Attitudes range from an tables indicating that an oct ienar
uncomprom,smg negative to an ian has exceeded his life ,pect
unyielding affirmative. Most opin ancy do not prove that he dead.
ions, however, while favoring one
Telling the Truth - Le: ,I As
approach, admit of exceptions.
prop
pects: Relating as it does
In point of fact, the entire emo erty rights. the making o <1 will,
tion-charged difficulty rests upon and other forensic matters l is no t
an untenable premise, viz., that surprising that a considera ,e body
"the truth" in any given instance of legal opinion is availab. on the
can be known to the physician. question of whether to tel the paWhat is "the truth"? That the pa tient the truth. Is there a legal
tient will live 3 months? Or 3 obligation to inform the h .Jelessly
years? That there will be pain? ill patient of his diagn ,is and
That radiation therapy will not prognosis? While an ur 1ualifled
f
effect marked palliation? That a answer is not possible, tl, gist o
onus
most
m
.•
sud
that
is
opinions
curative chemotherapeutic agent
will not be found? That the patient does exist.16
According to Regan. 1 '
will not die of an unrelated myo
cardial infarct tomorrow? It is a It is extremely doubtful that ., physician
little paradoxical that the medical has a therapeutic privilege to "'ithhold .•
specific diagnosis from a patiL'nt who is
profession, usually so circumspect, sick
with serious or fatal illness. To the
conservative, and· cautious, should contrary, the confidential relationshi p re
quires
in ordinary circumstancl'S that the
assume this aura of omniscience in physician
make a frank and full dis·
the prec1,,e disease-category where closure of all the pertinent facts to any
reliable information is most lack adult and mentally competent patient.
ing. neoplasia. As a result one
While the precise amount of de
conceivably could make short shrift tail required to constitute "the

132

LINACRE QUARTERLY

truth" is usually conceded to be
debatable, the legal principle seems
clear. In his pertinent review
Taylor16 states,
The patient has a right to know the truth
All lawyers will agree that a doctor may
not breach his duty to his patient through
deceit or a lie. The doctor's duty to tell
the patient of his critical condition so he
can put his worldly and spiritual affairs
in order does not require the doctor to
disclose all of the diagnostic data in
detail, or to tell him the precise nature
of his illness. A doctor may reasonably
presume that a patient does not desire
knowledge which would injure rather
than help, but the doctor may not rely
upon this presumption contrary to the pa
tie nt's known desire for full knowledge.

In the legal sphere, then, which
codifles man's behavior as a social
animal, there appear to exist no
permissive opinions by which the
physician may justify a course of
deliberate deceit. Precisely what
constitutes deceit, however, re
mains moot.
Telling the Truth-Psycho/ogic
Aspects: Despite the fact that

there are many diseases more un
predictable, disabling, and lethal.
no diagnosis imparts the emotional
or psychologic impact of "cancer."
The very derivation of the word
suggests fear and horror. Under
these circumstances, therefore. in
forming the patient of this diag
nosis may evoke grave psychologi
cal stresses. It is likely, however.
that these stresses may actually be
greater if such information is with
held.

A major source of difficulty for
the "hopeless" cancer patient is the
sense of isolation that is foisted
upon him. As Rothenberg IS states:
Communication is characteristically dis
napted in terminal cancer to a greater
fltent than in almost any other illness.
Patients are frequent! y not told that they
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have cancer or that they arc dying ...
Although withholding this information
may seem justified in a particular case,
it must be borne in mind that this inevit
ably results in disrupted communication
on all ·sid es and creates other problems.
For one thing, an almost unavoidable ef
fect of a disruption of communication is
an increase in the patient's isolation and
loneliness.
In some cases the physician may feel that
information about the patient s disease
should be withheld from him in spite of
the potential danger of isolation. The
important principle in management is
simply to be aware of the trouble spots,
not to take a dogmatically rigid position
on them .... The temptation to support
processes such as denial, magical thinking,
and the avoidance of issues stimulating
unrealistic guilt may be dictated by the
physician's inner conviction that death
cannot be faced realistically by patient
or by himself. This is not a necessary

assumption.

A reason frequently advanced
for not informing a patient is the
possibility of a cataclysmic psychi
atric response, perhaps leading to
suicide. The ability of the average
patient to cope with the truth, how
ever is often underestimated by the
physician. After the initial shock
there is usually successful adapta
tion and adjustment. Adequate
statistics are not available but
suicide as a direct consequence of
learning the truth seems rare. 19, 20
In most cases, therefore, there
appear to be compelling psycho
logic reasons for adequately in
forming the patient of his diagnosis
and prognosis.
Telling the Truth - Medical
Aspects: Do specifically medical

reasons exist for making a patient
privy to his diagnosis and prog
nosis? Certainly when disfiguring
or disabling palliative surgery is
indicated the patient will wish to
be informed of the reason for such
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measures. And when potentially
hazardous drugs are employed he
should be told both of their risk
and indication. Furthermore, a pa
tient whose symptoms prove re
fractory to therapy may frequently
be dissuaded from vain and expen
sive recourse to other physicians or
clinics only by disclosure of the
nature of his disease.
Although these medical reasons
in favor of informing the patient
may seem weak and inconclusive,
it should be indicated that purely
medical reasons for not doing so
are virtually non-existent.
What are the attitudes of the
laity and of the profession toward
this issue? In most studies based
upon patient response there has
been a marked preference for be
ing told the truth,2 1, 22 and serious
problems resulting from this policy
have not been frequent. Physi
cians, on the other hand, show a
decided preference for not telling
the truth. Fitts and Ravdin,23 i n
. a study based on 114 physicians,
found that 70 per cent either never
informed the patient or usually did
not, while only 30 per cent always
or usually did so. Ninety per cent
of physicians in a more recent sur
vey24 indicated a preference for
not telling. According to this in
vestigation:
Although clinical experience was cited by
three-quarters (of physicians) as the
major policy determinant, the data bear
no relation to experience or age. Instead,
inconsistencies, opinionatedness, and re.
sistance to change arid to research were
found which indicated emotion-laden a
priori personal judgments as the real de
terminants. Feared reactions to telling
(e.g., suicide) could rarely be substanti
ated. Equally undocumented assumptions
were given as justifications for telling.
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Underlying were feelings of pes
and futility about cancer. The
feelings mobilized by our deep and
concern for cancer patients, and ou
culties in helping them, stimulate
mechanisms. These responses, un
ately, operate as interferences to p
in cancer therapy.

nism
,ong
·ious
Jilli
·!Dial
rtun�
gress

In 1946, Lund2., concluded
The doctor is bound in his duty
patient to do whatever is best
patient and to avoid doing him h,.
discussing his patient's conditic
doctor realizes that there are so
cumstances when he cannot, for
tient's own good, tell him the
truth." However, there arc otl
quent circumstances in which frie
relatives want the "whole trutl,
pleasant) kept from the patient
is much better for the patient
doctor to be quite fr ank.

:, hi,
r his
1. In
the
• cir•
e pa
vhole
· fre�
s and
( un1en it
r the

In brief, we seem t o be ·aced
with the startling paradox , at as
patients more and more i. Iicate
a preference for being inf med,
physicians are becoming me · and
more reluctant to do so. S· cula
tion on the reason for this , vain ,
but it may be that preocc• ,ation
and
with sophisticated diagno,
advanced instrumentation 1 s ex
erted a dehumanizing influe ce on
the modern physician who, aving
less intimate knowledge of t' c spir•
itual resources of his pat �nt, is
apt grossly to underestimaL them.

Telling the Truth - P.actic al
Aspects: Certain practical factors

influence the decision to inform the
patient, and to do so truth fully. If
the physician imparts a distorted
version of the actual state of af
fairs, he may experience difficulty
in repeating it accurately at a late r
date. "A liar," said Quintilian,
"should have a good memory."
The problem is further compound
ed if more than one physician is
involved.
LINACRE QUARTERL Y

In point of fact, there are prob
ably few "hopeless" cancer pa
tients who do not realize the diag
nosis and prognosis, even though
they may be unwilling to verbalize
it to themselves. What intelligent
patient can go daily to a Cancer
Institute for radiation therapy and
not suspect the diagnosis? What
patient can report for inordinately
frequent follow-up examinations
and not suspect? What patient can
undergo extensive extirpative sur
gery and not suspect? As a corol
lary to this, patients have occasion
ally stated that the really insur
mountable burden was not the
knowledge of the disease but the
difficulty of trying to satisfy family
or physician by pretending not to
know.
In addition, the patient who

learns that he has been deliberately

misled will find it impossible to re
pose any tuture confidence in his
medical advisor. This will often
occur at a juncture in the patient's
illness when such confidence i's
necessary for adequate treatment.
Finally, a patient with financial
family obligations may be
spared imprudent or disasttous
decisions only by receiving full
prognostic information.
or

Telling the Truth-Moral (Eth
ical) and Spiritual Aspects: In

response to a patient's direct ques
tion a direct lie is never morally
justifiable. "Thou shalt not bear
false witness .. ." But apart from
this explicit prohibitive dictum,
human dignity demands that the
patient have opportunity of know
ing the truth.26, 21 This does not
alw ays involve a detailed explanaAucusT, 1962

tion of all medical facets of the
case, but it does require a practical
and honest presentation of what is
neces.sary and suitable for the pa
tient to know.
A patient's dignity as a Chris
tian, too, demands that he have
access to the truth. "To retard by
silence," said Pope Pius XII, "a
sick person's preparation for the
grand passage to eternity can be a
grave fault." Directive 7 of Ethi

cal and Religious Directives for
Catholic Hospitals 28 is quite spe
cific on this point:

Everyone has the right and the duty to
prepare for the solemn moment of death.
Unless it is dear, therefore, that a dying
patient is already well-prepared for death,
as regards both temporal and spiritual
affairs, it is the physician's duty to inform,
or to have some responsible person impart
this information.

There are, therefore, explicit
prohibitions against lying to a pa
tient, as well as cogent reasons for
actively informing him of the truth.
An unqualified statement of obli
gation, however, is not possible.
As a guide in these circum
stances, Lynch29 states:
. . .. a doctor's strict moral duty to in
form the patient would seem to include
only I. information necessary to the pa
tient in order to insure successful therapy,
and 2. foreknowledge in proper time of
approaching death ....The moral prin
ciple involved is altogether clear: act
always in the best interests of the patient.

Speaking as a psychiatrist,
Meyer:io similarly suggests that
there is a hierarchy of obligations
and that the precept to "do no
harm" may take precedence over
"the process that is quaintly called
telling the truth."

Telling the Family and Others:

In general there would seem to be
135

an obligation in justice. and prob carefully weighed, there shoul be
ably in charity, to inform at least no infringement on the direc, .Ja
one responsible member of the pa tient-physician relationship w ch,
tient's family in pertinent diag in its own sphere, is as intima as
nostic and prognostic matters. This that of patient with family. Al
is particularly so if the patient is though considerable pressure .:an
unaware of the facts, and in this be brought to bear on the phy• ian
situation the obligation would ap by the family, strictly speakin the
pear to have legal roots as well. latter would seem to have no xal
How far does this onus extend? or legal right to interfere ii this
Certainly not beyond the immedi matter. Conversely, and fu • in
ate family, unless there are others keeping with the relations!. , of
whose social or business connec patient with physician, the p ient
tions with the patient are such that may insist that the family r • be
a valid claim to information may informed, a stricture that th, ihy
be made.
sician is bound to respect.
In keeping with the growing be
How to Tell the Truth: I has
lief that the patient should be suit been intimated, "telling the uth"
ably informed is the tendency to is not synonymous with a b tally
inform the family as well. West frank, concise, clinical recit;i m of
berg�1 has presented a considered diagnostic and prognostic fe s. It
Christian exposition of why this should always be done
ntly.
approach is desirable and how best compassionately, and si1• ·rely.
to accomplish it.
Hope should not be dash I but
One of the difficulties that may positively encouraged, a J 3ition
arise when pertinent information is easy to assume in these t' ys of
not available to all interested par rapid medical progress. J . alism
. ties has been stated by Kline and should be tempered with op rnism.
veracity with charity. ('I little
Sobin:32
thought will make it clear o you
vi some cases, when the family has
knowledge and the patient has not, the that charity and veracity, b th be
patient himself exerts much pressure to ing commended by God, annot
find out "what the doctor said." At times, possibly be in real conflict e .r ."34)
strong guilt feelings may be created in
the family if they have to tell deliberate
A practical norm in thi� matter
lies, and sometimes the situation can be
helped if the statement to the family is is never to volunteer inform ,tion or
worded in an equivocal manner; however,
gratuitously to expand on a, ailable
it should still be clear.
data. In general, the patknt will
Christopher,'13 a strong propon make obvious how much he wishes
ent of the "do not tell" school, in to know. For example, in response
dicates that he has, on a rare occa to his query regarding what was
sion when he had decided to inform found at operation one might repl y.
the patient, refrained from doing "A tumor." Many patients will not
so at the behest of the family. Al- pursue the matter further. For
. though the advice of the family in those who do. information in re
this matter should certainly be sponse to direct questioning might
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include the fact that the tumor was
malignant, but of low grade, and
that all gross disease was removed.
It is usually simple and expedient
to be guided by the patient.
For the patient who must under

go surgery, a full preoperative dis

cussion of the possibilities will go
far toward obviating later difficul
ties. Certainly, when the surgeon
must recommend a serious opera
tion for malignancy. this possibility
should be mentioned to any patient
who might otherwise be inclined to
temporize dangerously. In general,
however, the surgeon can honestly
adopt an attitude of uncertainty
concerning the precise diagnosis.
With specific reference to lung
tumors, for example. the patient
may be told that much will depend
on.the findings at operation - that
some tumors are best treated by
resection and that this will be done
if indicated; that others respond
better to radiation and this will be
learned from biopsy of the lesion;
and that for some a combination of
excision and radiation is indicated.
Thus the ground-work is laid for
an acceptable explanation to the
patient if the lesion is non-resect
able, or if there is an indication for
post-operative radiation therapy.
"Telling the patient," then, is a
gradual process. not an abrupt rev
elation.

Semantics play a great role in

this matter, with the word "cancer"

being accorded entirely unwarrant

ed connotations by physician and

patient alike. It is therefore impor
tant. if the patient asks. "Is it can

cer?" , to explain that "cancer"

means many things of diverse im-
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port and that it is rot really a
meaningful word. It may be help
ful to make an analogy with the
word "infection," explaining that
etiologies, prognoses, and manifes
tations of infections are so varied
that the unqualified noun is almost
meaningless. And so it is with
"cancer."

To conclude, there are pertinent
legal. psychologic, medical. prac
tical. moral. and spiritual reasons
for informing the patient. Secon
darily. there are strong indications
for informing the patient's family.
In this context, however, "the
truth" is not an absolute entity but
merely a �atter of clinical judg
ment. The patient should be in
formed gently, compassionately,
sincerely. and gradually. While
the arguments in favor of ade
quately and suitably informing the
patient are almost incontrovertible,
the fundamental moral principle
remains: Act always in the best
interests of the patient.
HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION

General Principles: A consider

ation of human experimentation is
unavoidable in any discussion of
the patient who is hopelessly ill
with a chronic disease. The mere
fact of hopelessness suggests itself
as a circumstance that might miti
gate the ethical obligations sur
rounding such experimentation. In
the case of the hopeless patient
these studies might be directly re
lated to the disease at hand or en
tirely unrelated to it. Further. the
objective might be either immediate
benefit to the subject or remote
benefit to others.
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Regardless of the scope or in ization as "hopeless," is intended to ;ti/y
ater
tent, however, the medico-moral an experimenter's self-permit for
boldness. It is an apparent atte� t to
conditions that must be met bdore express a conscious effort of restrc1 t on
proceeding with human experimen his part when, in performing expe tents
endanger the lives of the expe 1ent...
tation on the "hopeless case" differ that
ed-on sick, the experimenter restric, him
in no respect from those obtaining self to those "marked by death.' It is
when the subject is healthy. The meant to be noble in the democrati, pirit,
yet it unconsciously challenges thi spirit
enlightened consent and desire of more
subti y but no less than the .;e of
the subject is imperative, the risk force, because it violates the con pt of
or brotherhood in violat ;J the
equality
must not be inordinate, and the
principle of the original patient-pl 5ician
cause must be proportionately relationship.
From the experi, nter's
grave. The attitude of the Church point of view, the description "ho lessly
germane to his , •pose.
not
is
incurable"
has been fully and explicitly pre
The designation is inadequate. b, use it
sented by Pope Pius XII in a now does not specify the time element hope
famous allocution.35 Ladimer36, 3 7 less within hours, days, month, years?
if months or years are co erned,
and Beecher 38 have reviewed the And,
do all experts agree on the status f their
problem comprehensively from respective sciences and deny the ,ssibil
medical. legal. and moral asi-,ects. ity of discovering effective agen within
such a period? ... From the st dpoint
Experimentation on the "Hope of the physician-friend, the ass ion is
less Case": With specific refer not germane to his purpose, ei r. To
him it is an expression of detach ent beence to the topic at hand, Beech tween
physician and patient. 1e an#
8
er'1 has assumed a firm attitude: nouncement of a scale of partn• nip vs.
quite contrary to it• ,riginal
.... the use of the "hopelessly incurable" domination.
spirit. As a matter of fact, it c. 1tes the
as experimental subjects has developed re paradox
the healthier th, patient.
that
cently. I have already stated the reasons the more he should
be the cone t of his
for my deep conviction that those who are physician;
the sicker, the less.
in imminent danger of death should not be
subjected to experimentation, except as
Claude Bernard, too, h, wres
part of the therapeutic effort for the ben tled with this problem:4 o
efit of the subjeot himself. Occasionally,
reports are found wherein use of the Others have made analogous ex criments
"hopelessly incurable" seems to justify on patients with phthisis doon. d to an
dangerous experimentation. The error in early death . .. As experimer of this
this .appears evident. It is not the physi kind are of great interest to sc , nee and
cian s prerogative to make or to profit can be conclusive only on man, .ney seem
from such dubious judgments.
to be wholly permissible when they in·
Human experimentation on the volve no suffering or harm to t ,r subject
of the experiment. For we mL ,, not de
"hopeless case" has also been dis ceive ourselves, morals do h>t forbid
cussed extensively by Guttentag:39 making experiments on one's neighbor or
on one s' self; in everyday hfe men do
This question illustrates the chaos that nothing but experiment on one another.
results when the two aspects of the Christian morals forbid only one thing,
patient-physician relationship are not doing ill to one's neighbor. S r,, among
recognized, and no conscious attempt is the experiments
that may be tri�d on man.
made to separate the two. All - the those
can only harm are forbidden,
scienc<.! of medicine, t,he suffering patient, those that
that are innocent are permissible,
the physician-experimenter, and the phy and those that may
do good are obliga
confusion.
this
by
lose
sician-friend tory.
The literature suggests that the classifi
cation of persons as "hopelessly sick" is
It would appear evident from the
not intended to be merely a presentation
of fact in the objective sense on the part foregoing, therefore, that human
of the experimenter, but, by its character- experimentation involving the

hopelessly ill is not of itself for
bidden, provided the ethical stric
tures surrounding an·y human ex
perimentation are observed. It is
also evident. however, that this
specific form of human experimen
tation is fraught with the danger
of self-deceit for the experimenter
and of injustice to the subject.
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Donations of Tissues or Organs:
Somewhat related to the problem
of human experimentation is that
of tissue or organ donation. Real
ization of the imminence of death
and the acquiring of a sense of true
values may impel the "hopeless"
patient to arrange for the post
mortem donation of such tissues or
organs as may be of value to the
living. Donation of eyes for cor
neal grafts would be a case in
point. This is an entirely accept
able and commendable act of
Christian charity, and in no way
conflicting with medico-moral
standards.41 Donation inter vivos,
however, raises difficulties that are
less easily resolved. 42 This is
largely due to the fact that only
recently have tissue and organ
transplantations of this type
emerged from the realm of philo
sophical speculation to that of
medical fact, and there has not
been opportunity for a considerable
body of theological opinion to ac
cumulate. However, certain state
ments of pertinent norms are avail
able,43 indication that transplanta
tion inter vivos is licit if the opera
tion does not gravely endanger the
life of the donor or impair his
functional integrity. In general. it
seems certain that the same ethical
considerations obtain when the

prospective donor is a "hopeless
case" as when he is healthy. At
present, much of this discussion is
theoretical because patients with
malignant disease are not usually
considered medically acceptable as
tissue donors.
To conclude, human experimen
tation upon the hopelessly ill pa
tient is permissible provided estab
lished ethical norms are respected.
The matter, however, is one of
great sensitivity and difficulty.
Tissue or organ donation by the
"hopeless case" is licit if moral
safeguards are observed; the ethi
cal problems are greater with
transplantations inter vivos than
with post mortem donations.
SPIRITUAL ASPECTS

As one whose perception of eter
nal values is sharpened by the evi
dent proximity of death, the hope
lessly ill patient may pose problems
of a unique spiritual nature. In
addition, it is with respect to the
"hopeless case" that miraculous
intervention assumes its greatest
pertinence.
The Last Sacraments: These in
clude Penance, Holy Eucharist re
ceived as Viaticum, and Extreme
Unction. 44, 45 The importance to
the Catholic patient of their worthy
reception cannot be overstated.4 6
Arrangements to this end should
be made well before the patient is
moribund or comatose, because an
adequate mental status is manda
tory for the unconditional recep
tion of Penance and for the ordi
nary reception of the Eucharist. In
this connection a recent study47
lends support to the contention
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that there are few medical contra
indications to the reception of Holy
Communion by the ill, except for
mental incompetence, defective
sensorium, and intractable vomit
ing.
The question of informing the
patient of his prognosis, treated in
the preceding section, has a par
ticular relevance here. In the first
place, full knowledge of the true
medical outlook would more likely
prompt the patient to set his spir
itual house in order then if perti
nent information were withheld.
Secondly, it is difficult to believe
that a knowledgeable Catholic pa
tient could receive the Last Sacra
ments without being cognizant of
the prognostic implication.

Miracles: A physical miracle in
volving the supernatural cure of a
hopelessly ill patient is an extra
ordinary occurrence almost by def
inition. Instances have been docu
mented, however, beginning with
the miracles of Christ and extend
ing even to our own day. In an
autobiographical note Alexis Car
rel48 has described the miraculous
cure at Lourdes in I 903 of a young
girl "hopelessly ill" with tubercu
lous peritonitis. Miracles in gen
eral. and modern miraculous cures
in particular, have been ably dis
cussed by Dr. Franc;ois Leuret,
former President o f the Lourdes
Medical Bureau, and Dr. Henri
Bon. 4 fl Since, as mentioned pre
viously.12 spontaneous regression
of malignancy has occasionally
been recorded, the supernatural
origin of miracles manifest in this
fashion might be called into doubt.
However, there are two marks that
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serve to distinguish mirac·
cures of this nature: 49 J. the
must be instantaneous, and 2.
must be complete absence 0 1
convalescence. In none of
spontaneously regressing ca
collected by Everson and C
were these criteria fulfilled.

ous
ure
:ere
any
the
cers
lei�

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIO _;

A case may be termed " Jpe
less" when there has been tab
lished a firm diagnosis of a ,·ela
tively chronic condition tha may
be expected to terminate I tally
because curative treatment is ither
not known or not applicable. �om
plex medico-moral problen are
inevitable when this subject con
sidered.
Difficulties associated witl ther
apy range from euthanasia, lhich
is not licit, to unconscionab' pro
longation of vital functions, ,·hich
is not desirable. The phys. ,an is
bound to employ "ordinary 1 .:ans"
to preserve life but need nol resort
to "extraordinary means." ! 1 gen
eral, it is wiser to err on t! .: side
of active therapy.
Imparting pertinent dia ., nostic
and prognostic information is an
other sensitive area. Whik there
can be no absolute rule in this mat
ter, there are forceful legal. psy
chologic. medical, practical. ethical.
and spiritual arguments in favor of
suitably and adequately informi ng
the patient and the family. The
fundamental moral principle re·
mains: Act always in the best in·
terests of the patient.
Human experimentation involv
ing the hopelessly ill is not of itself
forbidden, provided the ethical
LINACRE QUARTER LY

strictures surrounding any human
experimentation are observed. It is
noted, however. that this form of
human experimentation is fraught
wit h the danger of self-deceit for
the experimenter and of injustice
to the subject.
The most important spiritual
aspect of the problem is concerned
with the proper reception of the
Last Sacraments by a Catholic pa
tient, or with appropriate prepara
tion for death by a non-Catholic
patient.
EPILOGUE

It must by now be apparent that
"hopeless case" is a misnomer ap
plied to a patient for whom the
physician has little hope. It does
not, however, represent the judg
ment of the patient. For there are
no "hopeless" patients. only hope
less doctors. Even the suicide dies
hoping for something better. With
this in mind, then, it would seem
desirable to expunge this term
from the lexicon of medicine, since
it introduces unwarranted emo
tional elements and serves as an
obstruction not only to the care
of the patient but also to the prog
ress of medicine.
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